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POLICYHOLDER RIGHTS
TO INDEPENDENT
COUNSEL:
ISSUES REMAIN REGARDING
COMPENSATION,
SUPERVISION OF
COUNSEL
BY JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, ESQ.

More than 30 years ago, a California appellate court decision
(San Diego Navy Federal Credit Union v. Cumis Insurance
Society, 162 Cal. App. 3d 358 (4th Dist. 1984)) worked a
revolution of sorts by ruling that, in cases of conflict between
an insurer and a policyholder defending against a plaintiff’s
claim, the insurer was obligated to permit the policyholder
to select its own defense counsel rather than having the case
defended by an attorney selected by the insurer.
The California legislature
essentially codified Cumis in
California Civil Code § 2860. Cases
or legislation from other jurisdictions
followed suit enough to make Cumis
the majority rule, and to make the term
“Cumis counsel” common insurance
parlance. See Randy Maniloff &
Jeffrey Stempel, General Liability
Insurance coverage: Key Issues in
Every State, Ch. 6 (3d ed., 2015)
(state-by-state survey).
The classic case presenting
a Cumis-style conflict involves a
claim in which the plaintiff sues the
policyholder alleging multiple claims,
some of which may fall within the
liability insurance coverage and some
of which may not. For example, a
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patron roughed up by a bouncer at a
club may allege both assault and battery
by the bouncer, as well as inadequate
training by the club and negligent
injurious conduct by the bouncer. Thus,
because the outcome of the case can
affect coverage, policyholder defendants
often seek to choose their own defense
counsel, reasoning that a lawyer selected
by the insurer (and most defense counsel
chosen by insurers is approved “panel”
counsel that obtains a significant amount
of business from insurers), may have an
incentive (perhaps even subconscious)
to defend the case in a manner that
makes a finding of uncovered battery
more likely than might be the case if the
policyholder’s chosen counsel defended
the litigation.

The Cumis
movement was
more evolutionary
than revolutionary in
Nevada. Until State Farm
Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Hansen,
131 Nev. Adv. Op. 74 (Sept. 24,
2015), Nevada law was not clear on
the point, although most observers
expected that Nevada would eventually
follow California’s lead on this topic,
particularly after Nevada Yellow Cab
Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court,
152 P.3d 737, 742 (Nev. 2007). Yellow
Cab ruled that both the policyholder/
defendant and the insurer were clients
of the attorney defending the case but

The Cumis movement was more
evolutionary than revolutionary
in Nevada. Until State Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins. Co. v. Hansen, 131
Nev. Adv. Op. 74 (Sept. 24, 2015),
Nevada law was not clear on the point,
although most observers expected
that Nevada would eventually follow
California’s lead on this topic,

that, in cases of
conflict, the
attorney’s greater duty was
to the insured defendant.
Having embraced the
two-client model of the insurerattorney-policyholder relationship
but favoring policyholder interests in the
event of conflict, the next logical step was to
require independent counsel rather than placing
insurer-selected counsel in the difficult position
of attempting to adequately represent two client
with divergent interests. See Jeffrey Stempel,
“The Relationship Between Defense Counsel,
Policyholders, and Insurers: Nevada Rides Yellow
Cab Toward “Two-Client” Model of Tripartite
Relationship. Are Cumis Counsel and Malpractice
Claims by Insurers Next?,” Nevada Lawyer (June
2007) p. 20.
continued on page 14
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POLICYHOLDER RIGHTS TO
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
Arguably, the two-client model is not a prerequisite to
requiring independent counsel in cases of conflict. If the defense
attorney’s only client is the policyholder, this presumably
heightens the judicial system’s interest in ensuring that counsel’s
loyalty is undivided and not colored by concern for the insurer,
who even if not a client is a third-party payer with substantial
contract rights (under the policy) to control defense and settlement
of the case. Relatedly, insurers expect regular updates from
defense counsel on the status of a case, which can place counsel
in a quandary about whether or not to report developments that
may support a coverage defense. The insurer is also a client,
presumably entitled to full disclosure by counsel of all matters
relevant to the representation — but perhaps not when this is
contrary to the interests of the policyholder client.
Perhaps the most important question remaining open
after Hansen is independent defense counsel’s selection and
compensation. California has a statutory provision stating that
counsel must have at least five years of litigation practice,
including “substantial defense experience in the subject at issue in
the litigation,” as well as professional liability insurance. Further:
[t]he insurer’s obligation to pay fees to the independent
counsel selected by the insured is limited to the rates which
are actually paid by the insurer to attorneys retained by it

in the ordinary course of business in the defense of similar
actions in the community where the claim arose or is being
defended. See Cal. Civ. Code § 2860(c); see also Wallis
v. Centennial Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 2d 1114 (E.D. Cal.
2013) (insurer not required to pay entire bill submitted by
independent counsel where counsel offered no evidence of
reasonableness and necessity of unpaid fees); J.R. Mktg.,
L.L.C. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 158 Cal. Rptr. 3d 41 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2013) rev. granted, 308 P.3d 860 (Sept. 18, 2013)
(where insurer breaches duty to defend, it loses protection
of the statute regarding rate to be paid to reimburse
policyholder for funding its own defense).
In the most recent issue of his newsletter Coverage Opinions,
Randy Maniloff finds a silver lining of Hansen that insurers are
overlooking. Maniloff’s prediction is that the Nevada Supreme
Court, having so fully embraced Cumis, is likely to embrace the
California Cumis statute regarding the rate of pay for independent
counsel as well. See A Win for Insurers: Nevada Supreme Court
Adopts “Cumis” Rule, available at http://coverageopinions.info/
Vol4Issue9 at p. 15 (Sept. 30, 2015). Perhaps this prediction will
prove accurate. California has operated under its approach for
many years, with apparent success.
But although the California approach makes
good sense as a tool or starting point for determining
independent counsel’s compensation, it should perhaps
not be an absolute rule. Insurers have a good argument
in contending that a policyholder should not be able to
select a $1,000/hour Wall Street law firm as independent
counsel on the liability insurer’s tab when the insurer
ordinarily pays $200/hour (or less) to panel counsel. But
converse unfairness can result if the insurer is able to
cap independent counsel fees below the rate at which the
policyholder can obtain adequate counsel of its choice.
Insurers are able to obtain counsel at lower rates
(unduly low rates, according to most any defense lawyer)
because of the insurer’s purchasing power and leverage.
But policyholders, particularly individuals and small
businesses, lack such leverage and often also lack the
expertise necessary for finding the most low-cost defense
attorneys for a given case. In order to make a truly
independent selection of counsel (e.g., an attorney not
recommended by the insurer), policyholders may have to
pay something more than the going rate for panel counsel.
Policyholders should also note that it is the insurer’s
conduct in disputing coverage that created the need for
independent counsel. Although a reservation of rights
does not create a per se conflict under Hansen, an
insurer’s defense without reservation would eliminate
possible conflicts and permit the insurer to defend through
panel counsel.

JEFFREY STEMPEL’S biography can be found
on page 27.
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